ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Assets owned by Australian Real Estate Investment Trusts (A-REITs, but formerly known as listed property trusts or LPTs) have grown substantially up to November 2007. Newell (2005) reports that these A-REITs had a compound average annual return of over 11.6% with a standard deviation of 8.2% compared to stocks which had a compound average annual return of around 9.1% and a standard deviation of 8.7% from June 1994 to June 2004. It appears that the capital market appreciated this high return and low risk feature that A-REITs grew in market capitalisation from around $10 billion in the mid-1990s to over $80 billion in the mid-2000s and Australian REITs held over 16% of the global REIT value (KPMG, 2007) . Only a few years earlier, Ratcliffe and Dimovski (2005) note that the A-REIT sector in 2004 accounted for around 10% of the global REIT value.
The strong performance of A-REITs is well documented in the academic literature. Newell and Peng (2006) report on the significance of the emerging property sectors such as self-storage, health care, retirement facilities and leisure/entertainment in investment portfolios. They find superior risk adjusted performance by these sectors as well as portfolio diversification benefits during 2002 to 2005 assesses the performance of industrial properties and notes that industrial A-REITs provided consistent and well-performed risk-adjusted returns during 1995 to 2006. Peng and Newell (2007) and later Newell and Peng (2008) also find that infrastructure funds performed strongly during 1995 to 2006 and provided useful diversification benefits. Since many A-REITs hold significant levels of international property in their portfolios, Newell and MacIntosh (2007) identify the variety of risk management strategies adopted by the A-REITs in managing their capital and income. The A-REIT sector was generally viewed as well managed, owning large, conservative, highly rated investment grade properties which were considered to have reliable and stable tenants and sound cash flows. The sector was a favourite amongst investors. Newell (2008) BDO Kendall (2008) suggest that the A-REIT sector started to be less attractive to investors in December 2007 and coincided with Centro Properties Group announcements to the ASX in that month. In brief, on December 17 th 2007, Centro Properties Group issued an announcement to the ASX essentially advising of three matters. Firstly, they advised that there would be increased costs associated with debt facilities and that capital expenditure restrictions imposed by the financiers would restrict growth in earnings in the United States. Secondly, that Centro managed A$26.6 billion of property assets, was performing in line with expectations and that they were continuing to negotiate the refinancing of A$1.3 billion (with the loan extended to 15 th February 2008). Thirdly, Centro suggested that to be prudent in terms of financing options that they would not pay a distribution for the second half of the year ended 31 st December 2007. The market did not take kindly to this announcement and Centro Properties share price was slashed from a closing price of over $6 the day before the announcement to a closing price of $1.36 on the day of the announcement. The smaller Centro Retail Trust which was about one fifth the size of Centro Properties issued a similar announcement suggesting they were performing strongly and that they were continuing to negotiate the refinancing of A$1.2 billion (with the loan extended to 15 th February 2008) and that to be prudent in terms of financing options that they would also not pay a distribution for the second half of the year ended 31 st December 2007. The price of Centro Retail Trust shares was also slashed from $1.42 the day before the announcement to a closing price of $0.85 on the day of the announcement. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of the global financial crisis using Centro's earnings revision and refinancing announcements as the event date to investigate the change in risk profile for Centro Properties, Centro Retail Trust and the other AREITs that were included in the S&P/ASX 300. The study finds that the systematic risk for many A-REITs moved significantly higher after these announcements and it suggests that this increase in systematic risk has major implications for the cost of capital to the sector.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, key capital asset pricing model and event study concepts are discussed. Section 3 outlines the data and the models. The results are discussed in section 4. The last section makes some concluding comments and discusses some implications for A-REITs.
THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL AND EVENT STUDY CONCEPTS
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was introduced to the finance community in the 1960s by Sharpe (1964) , Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) . The model builds on the work of Markowitz (1952) . The CAPM suggests that an asset's risk is made up of systematic and unsystematic risk components. Systematic risk reflects how each individual asset has moved against the market. Unsystematic risk is risk that is peculiar or specific to the individual asset. Elton and Gruber (1977) point out clearly how the average standard deviation of returns for a portfolio of stocks can be reduced substantially by having more stocks in the portfolio. As such, investors will only be rewarded for systematic risk (beta value) because unsystematic risk can be diversified away.
In this study of the 25 A-REIT constituents of the S&P/ASX 300, and using 150 days of returns prior to December 17, 2007, only Centro Properties Group and Valad Property Group showed betas of more than one. Most of the others had betas substantially less than one (Astro Japan Property Trust is excluded from the analysis because it joined the list on 27 July 2007 and hence insufficient data was available).
A common CAPM use is to calculate a firm's cost of equity (which is also the required rate of return by shareholders) and then can be used to value the firm. Large increases in required rates of return by shareholders mean large increases in the cost of equity to the firm, therefore decreases in the value of the firm. A second use is in event studies to work out "abnormal" returns at or after an event day (or days). Abnormal returns are the actual returns less the normal or expected return (MacKinlay, 1997). The following general market model is used to calculate normal or expected returns:
( 1) where: E(R i,t ) = The expected return on security i on day t; α i = The intercept term; β i = The slope or beta coefficient; R m,t = The actual return for the market index, in this study, the ASX All Ordinaries Index; and ε i,t = The standard error, and the abnormal return is: ( 2 ) where:
R i,t = The actual return on security i on day t; E(R i,t ) = The expected return on security i on day t; A R i,t = The abnormal return being the difference between the actual return and expected returns above.
Event study methodology has been well used in the property literature to determine whether a particular event in the capital market or in a company or industry sector affects an entity's share price performance. Some event studies are simply concerned with abnormal returns on a particular day (like this one), but many studies sum abnormal returns to calculate a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) which tries to measure the total impact of an event through a time period (or event window). Some recent property literature that use event study methodology include:
• The wealth effects of REIT acquisitions (Allen and Sirmans, 1987; Campbell et al, 2001) • The wealth effects of real estate acquisitions and disposals (Glascock et al. 1989; Ting et al, 2006) .
DATA AND MODELS
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the Centro announcements on the market model for Centro Properties and Centro Retail Trust and investigate whether abnormal returns occurred on 17 December 2007. The study also investigates whether there has been a statistically significant change in the systematic risk for the two Centro entities after this announcement or event day.
After investigating ASX announcements from all the other listed property trust constituents of the S&P/ASX 300 at the time, and finding no particularly unusual or controversial announcements from any of them, this study further investigates whether any abnormal returns were incurred by any of the other A-REITs on the 17th December, the Centro announcements or events day. The study follows on with an investigation whether there has been a statistically significant change in the systematic risk for the other 23 A-REITs after 17 th December. Daily share price data for 150 days before the event day, on the event day and 150 days after the event day for each of the 25 A-REIT constituents on the S&P/ASX 300 and All Ordinaries Index data has been sourced from FinAnalysis. The pricing data was subsequently converted into return data and the market model estimated for all 25 A-REITs.
The estimated model is:
A-REIT i, = β0 + β1RMKT+ β2EVENTDAY + β3AFTEREDAY + β4AFTEREDAY*RMKT + ε
where:
• A-REIT i, is the A-REIT under investigation • RMKT is the return on the market (All Ordinaries Index)
• EVENTDAY is the event dummy variable which contains a 1 on December 17 th and zeros the days before and after this event day • AFTEREDAY is an additive dummy and contains zeros up to December 17 th and ones the days after this event day
• AFTEREDAY*RMKT is a multiplicative dummy measuring the return on the market after the event day and the β's are unknown parameters to be estimated and ε is assumed ~ N (0, σ²). Table 1 reports results for the mean daily returns and the standard deviation of those daily returns for each of the 25 A-REITs. The first column identifies the A-REIT. The second column identifies the mean daily returns and the standard deviation of daily returns for each of the 25 A-REITs for the 301 day period of the study. The mean daily returns for all but Commonwealth Property Office (CPA) over the period were negative (CPA was however zero). The third column identifies the mean daily returns and the standard deviation of daily returns for each of the 25 A-REITs for the 150 days prior to the event day and shows a mixture of positive, zero and negative mean daily returns. The standard deviation of daily returns is substantially lower than that of the whole 301 day sample. The last column identifies the mean daily returns and the standard deviation of daily returns for each of the 25 A-REITs for the 150 days after the event day and shows only negative mean daily returns. The standard deviation of daily returns is substantially higher than that of the whole 301 day sample and certainly higher than for the 150 day period prior to the event day. Figure 1 illustrates the post event day mean daily returns diagrammatically. Average daily losses incurred by investors in this sector were about 4/10ths of 1%, but investors in Centro Properties and APN European Retail incurred average daily losses of about 1%. Clearly, the post event day period was substantially worse in terms of returns to investors and substantially more volatile to such investors. While the standard deviation of daily returns to investors before the event day was around 1%, it was around 3-4% after the event day. 
A-REIT RESULTS

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR A-REITs
The study finds that Centro Properties, Centro Retail Trust and seven of the other 23 A-REIT constituents on the S&P/ASX 300 recorded statistically significant negative abnormal returns on 17 th December 2007 and that the systematic risk for many A-REITs moved significantly higher after this date.
It appears that the impact of the global financial crisis has been particularly severe on the A-REIT sector and the sector's reliance on debt, even though the borrowings were supported by relatively reliable and stable rental income, has caused this sector to be one of the hardest hit. It also appears that the systematic risk of many of the firms in the sector changed dramatically from being more conservative investments than the market on average, to becoming more risky investments than the market on average.
A serious implication for A-REITs is the increase in the cost of equity and hence it's weighted average cost of capital. Because the weighted average cost of capital has increased, and equity values have fallen dramatically, A-REITs have tried to raise substantial new equity capital via private placements and rights issues at significant discounts over the last 20 months. Many A-REITs have also sold down property assets to shore up gearing positions.
As for Centro Properties Group, they have sold a great deal of property, are still listed and appear to have weathered the global financial crisis, albeit at much reduced share prices. However, the directors as at late October 2009, are being sued by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) for incorrectly classifying short term debt as noncurrent liabilities in the 2007 accounts. ASIC is also seeking management bans against the entire 2007 board for breach of duty by approving accounts containing material misstatements.
